ABOUT THIS REPORT
Measuring police corruption has proven to be a difficult task for researchers. A recent study applied a new approachrather than focusing on cor ruption, researchers measured the integrity of police officers and their organizations. The tools and techniques the re searchers developed for the study can be used by police executives to find out how well officers understand their agency's rules on misconduct as well as their opinions about the seriousness of the differ ent types of misconduct, the appropriate discipline for the misconduct, and their willing ness to report the behavior.
What did the researchers find?
An agency's culture of integri ty, as defined by clearly un derstood and implemented policies and rules, may be more important in shaping the ethics of police officers than hiring the "right" people. The cooperation of line officers is essential in detecting breach es of integrity, but concern for the personal welfare of their colleagues discourages many officers from reporting misconduct. Weakening the silencing effect of this con cern is vital to enhancing integrity within an agency.
Officers learn to evaluate the seriousness of various types of misconduct by observing their department's behavior in detecting and disciplining it. If unwritten policy conflicts with written policy, the result ing confusion undermines an agency's overall integrity enhancing efforts.
Through officers' anonymous responses to hypothetical scenarios about misconduct, managers can measure the level of integrity within the department and pinpoint problems involving miscon duct. Researchers identified five steps police executives can take to enhance line offi cer cooperation in reporting misconduct.
What were the study's limitations?
The survey sample overse lected municipal police agen cies, excluded agencies from the Western and Midwestern parts of the Nation, and in cluded no State police agen cies, only one sheriff's agency, and only one county agency.
To establish and maintain offi cer integrity, police adminis trators may want to look well beyond recruiting persons of good character. By establishing certain integrityenhancing policies and rules in their agencies, they may be able to imbue their organizations with a culture or environment of integrity (see "How the Researchers Defined Police Integrity" for a discussion of the components of a culture of integrity).
This research is based on re sponses given by 3,235 offi cers from 30 law enforcement agencies across the Nation to questions about hypothetical scenarios related to miscon duct. Their responses helped the researchers identify and describe those characteristics of a police agency culture that encourage employees to re sist or tolerate certain types of misconduct. 
H RESEARCHERS DEFINED POLICE INTEGRITY
The concept of integrity can unite police and citizens into discussion of police misconduct that might be difficult organizations as well as individuals. Their broad definition, tions to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupa tion," became the basis for an organizational model of and analysis.
The model had four dimensions of organizational integrity:
❋ Creation and communication of organizational rules.
❋ Detection, investigation, and discipline of rule violations.
❋ Circumspection of officer silence about rule violations.
❋ Managing the influence of public expectations and OW THE using other terminology. As the researchers defined it for this study, "police integrity" can be an attribute of police "the normative inclination among police to resist tempta integrity. This model helped structure their observations agency history.
❋ How willing are they to report the misconduct? Action: If they are willing, fine. Where they are not, find ways of getting them to do so.
The researchers ranked the 30 responding agencies according to their environ ments of integrity and chose three highly ranked agencies for indepth evaluation and field observations. 3 These were designated "agencies of integrity. "
Do officers know the rules?
Although the three agencies of integrity invested consider able resources in developing rules to guide officer conduct, many officers were not clear on some areas of official poli cy. For example, in all three departments, more than 10 percent of officers were not certain whether a supervisor who exploited his authority for personal gain would be in violation of official policy. Similarly, nearly 15 percent of officers in two of the agen cies of integrity and almost onethird of officers in the third were not aware that a coverup by a police officer of another officer's DUI and minor accident would violate official policy.
In two of the agencies, more than 10 percent of officers did not know that it would be a violation of official policy to fail to arrest a friend on a fe lony warrant and instead warn him of the warrant's existence. In the third, accepting half price meals and other small gifts was prohibited on paper but permitted in practice. Con tradictions such as this may promote confusion and make it difficult for officers to deter mine proper policy in other, more consequential areas.
Study findings suggest that an agency's official policy can be undermined by an informal, unwritten version. To avoid this, police managers need to follow the written policy in practice and train officers who are unclear on official policy. Another option, of course, is to change the official policy to fit the practice.
Do officers support the rules?
Although all three departments offered training on the accept able and unacceptable ways for officers to conduct them selves, researchers found fre quent discrepancies between agency values and employee values. They also found mini mal instruction on the seri ousness of specific types of misconduct.
Officers learned to gauge the seriousness of various types of misconduct by observing their department's diligence in detecting it and disciplining those who engaged in police misconduct. If a department welcomed complaints about misconduct, thoroughly inves tigated those complaints, and disciplined officers appropri ately for the misbehavior, then officers concluded that such misconduct was serious. How ever, if an agency ignored or discouraged complaints and failed to investigate or punish officers for such violations, officers learned not to take those violations seriously.
Do officers know what discipline they face for violating the rules?
Discipline plays a central role in conveying the gravity of misconduct by demonstrat ing what the agency regards as serious. One of the three agencies studied had a strong record of disclosing its discipli nary actions, perhaps because State law 4 requires that the full details of every discipli nary decision, including the internal investigation, be made available upon request.
On the other hand, laws that try to keep disciplinary actions private generally do not suc ceed. For example, although the disciplinary system in one agency operated under rules supposedly designed to pro tect personnel decisions from public scrutiny, within hours the media had the full details of any serious disciplinary action. In another, an active underground network spread the details of virtually every highprofile case. Departments that are prohibited from com menting on disciplinary actions behavior as well as common defects in integrity, such as discourtesy to civilians, abuse of arrest
Selected scenarios
An officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays, local merchants and restaurant and bar own ers show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts of food and liquor.
that officer. He reports that the watch had been stolen during the burglary. from the shop owner.
supervisor offers to give him these days off if he agrees to tune up his supervisor's personal car. Evaluate the supervisor's behavior. not hurt but is obviously intoxicated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting of reporting this violation, the officer agrees to accept a couple of free drinks from the owner. Two officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an automobile. The man flees.
An officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains the amount of money equivalent to a full day's pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost property, but keeps the money for himself.
An officer who was severely beaten by a person resisting arrest has just returned to duty. On patrol, the officer approaches a person standing in a dimly lit alley. Suddenly, the person throws a gym bag at the officer and begins to run away. The officer fatally shoots the person, striking him in the back. It was later
In responding with her male partner to a fight in a bar, a young female officer receives a black eye from member of the team punches him very hard in the kidney area saying, "Hurts, doesn't it." hell are you stopping me for?" The officer replies, "Because today is 'Arrest an Asshole Day.'" A sergeant, without intervening, watches officers under his supervision repeatedly strike and kick a man arrested for child abuse. The man has previous child abuse arrests. Evaluate the sergeant's behavior. or that refuse to do so, consid ering them to be protected personnel matters, may create suspicions outside and inside the agency and thereby com promise police integrity.
In all three agencies, most officers agreed on the expect ed and appropriate discipline, particularly for serious offens es, and the researchers found that after the discipline was handed down, most officers had correctly interpreted their agency's disciplinary threat. Most of the official violations on record, however, were less serious. How do officers form their opinions of the expected and appropriate dis cipline for less serious offens es-those the department rarely or never addresses?
The answer to that question lies in two processes found to be at work in these agencieshow departments accept and investigate complaints of mis conduct and the severity with which they address less seri ous misconduct.
Receiving citizen complaints.
All three departments wel comed citizen complaints, often went to great lengths to receive them, and serious ly reviewed and investigated them. Officers reported that their agencies gave undue attention to trivial complaints, but none believed that their department would allow a complaint of officer miscon duct to be ignored or go un punished if sustained. The seriousness with which the three departments respond ed to minor violations left no doubt in officers' minds that their departments would not hesitate to take severe disci plinary action in response to serious violations.
Disciplining less serious misconduct. The survey of 30 police agencies revealed a consensus on the relative rank ordering of the serious ness of various forms of mis conduct. This consensus implies that even when no actual incidents are available as examples, officers under stand that: (1) more serious offenses will be disciplined more harshly; and (2) less serious misconduct also will be disciplined accordingly.
Lessons learned. The researchers identified two practices that they believe enhance integrity. The first is to consistently address rela tively minor offenses with the appropriate discipline. From this, officers may infer that major offenses, too, are likely to be disciplined.
The second recommended practice is to disclose the dis ciplinary process and resulting discipline to public scrutiny. Sunshine laws may be a potent deterrent to both indi vidual and organizational incli nations to conceal misconduct.
5

Do officers think discipline is fair?
Disciplinary severity in 2 of the 3 agencies was among the highest of the 30 agencies surveyed, yet most officers in these agencies thought the prescribed discipline was fair (even though the actual disci pline imposed differed some what from what was expected). The degree of discipline each organization could impose sometimes was limited by court decisions that over turned or reduced disciplinary decisions on appeal. Adminis trators must carefully balance passion for integrity with con cern for morale, since every appeal that reverses or reduces a disciplinary decision potential ly alters officers' views about what is expected of them.
In all three agencies, officers observed inconsistencies in discipline.
How willing are officers to report misconduct?
The survey results suggest that, more than any other fac tor, concern for the welfare of their peers led officers to refrain from reporting the misconduct of other officers.
Officers shielded a colleague willingly if the misconduct oc curred for what they perceived to be good reasons, such as sleeping on duty because a sick spouse or child prevented an officer from getting enough sleep. On the other hand, offi cers reluctantly concealed mis conduct they perceived to be irresponsible, chronic, or ex ploitative, such as sleeping on duty because of excessive partying or offduty employ ment. Only when another offi cer's exploitation of their support became unbearable, chronic, or put their own posi tion at risk, would officers alert a supervisor to the miscon duct. Even then, they sought to conceal their identities.
Although this concern for col leagues can explain officers not reporting serious miscon duct, this was not the case in the three agencies studied. The researchers believe that the relative success these agencies had in encouraging officers to come forward de rived from five strategies used to weaken officers' tendency not to report misconduct:
❋ They made it explicit that they would discipline either an officer's failure to report a colleague's misconduct or a supervisor's failure to dis cipline an errant officer.
❋ They fired any officer caught lying during a misconduct investigation, no matter how minor the offense under investigation. This action was highly valued because of its dampening effect on officers' willingness to con ceal a peer's misconduct.
❋ One agency rewarded offi cers who reported their col leagues' misconduct and, to avoid repercussions and possible antagonism from fellow officers, kept these rewards secret.
❋ They allowed anonymous and confidential reporting.
❋ Because the loyalty and sup port that officers come to expect from one another can be a source of the failure to report misconduct, the agen cies sought to prevent the bond among officers from becoming too strong. To do this, two agencies regularly rotated new supervisors between service areas, patrol districts, and patrol teams. One agency also introduced racial, ethnic, gender, educational, political, cultural, religious, and gener ational diversity into the department.
How can police managers enhance integrity?
An organization cannot safely presume that all employees possess moral courage and good character. Nor can it presume that all of those individuals who do possess these qualities will be strong enough to resist the tempta tion to break or bend the rules or to disregard the bonds that form between peers.
With this in mind, the re searchers identified several factors they believe foster integrity within a police department.
Integrity is driven by an organization's culture. To encourage officer adherence to rules of conduct, law en forcement agencies may find adopting the view that integrity is an organizational or occupational responsibility is more effective than em phasizing personal ethics or morality. The researchers believe that this places direct responsibility for officer in tegrity on police administra tors, obligating them to create and sustain an organizational culture of integrity.
The rules governing mis conduct should be speci fied and officers trained in their application. The re searchers also believe that an effective way to educate both the police and the public is to disclose the entire disciplinary process to maximum public scrutiny.
How police managers de tect, investigate, and disci pline misconduct will show officers how serious they consider the misconduct to be. In choosing levels of dis cipline, police administrators should understand the educa tional consequences of their disciplinary acts.
Administrators should expressly require all offi cers to report misconduct. This will reduce the likelihood that they will keep silent about their peers' misconduct. Managers must clearly state that any officer who lies dur ing the course of an internal investigation will be fired. A guarantee of anonymity and confidentiality as well as re wards to officers who come forward to report the miscon duct of their peers may cause more of them to do so. By encouraging diversity within the force, rotating assign ments, and changing officer assignments following their promotions, managers can discourage the bonds that lead to officers covering up misconduct.
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